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Works councils were not always as undisputed as they are today among trade
unions and the great majority of employers. Already in the period of early
industrialization liberal politicians and social reformers advocated bodies of
workers representatives, called factory or workers' committees (Fabrik-
ausschiisse or Arbeiterausschusse). In addition, some early social-minded em-
ployers relinquished some of their traditional prerogatives by setting up com-
mittees designed to air workers' collective views. Prussian state bureaucrats,
too, conceived of workforce representation at the plant level as part of their
general political program to modernize state and society, together with a voca-
tional training system, an industrial code (Gewerbeordnung), and a system of
social insurance. But not until 1891 did the amended industrial code provide
for optional workers committees, which were made obligatory in 1905 for the
mining industry in the wake of extensive industrial strife. At that time
the unions still opposed such institutions as—in the view of August Bebel, the
leader of the Social Democratic party—mere "fig-leaves of capitalism."
During the First World War the unions and the Social Democratic party ob-
served a policy of collaboration with the war government (Burgfriedenspoli-
tik). A special law (Gesetz iiber den vaterlandischen Hilfsdienst) extended
workers committees to all factories with more than 50 employees in industries
of basic importance to the war economy. After the war, when works councils
were legally established in the Weimar Republic in 1920, they were designed
to preempt the revolutionary council movement. Being stripped of political
functions, the workers' councils became industrial works councils (Betriebs-
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rate). On the day the Works Councils Act was passed, a powerful demonstra-
tion of revolutionary workers and militant trade unionists marched to the Ber-
lin parliament. Machine-gun fire violently ended the march, killing 42
demonstrators.
The political and economic turbulence of the Weimar Republic did not give
the works councils a real chance to develop their potential. Because of their
politically radical background, they were kept subordinate to a cooperative
union movement that desperately tried to play its part in the reconstruction of
a peace economy and the building of a social democratic society. At the time,
the common goal of the legislator and of the employers and unions was the
"unionization of the works councils." A thorough analysis of the period came
to the conclusion that the legislator defined the works council as "an organ of
the collective agreement" (Brigl-MatthiaB [1926] 1978, 15), primarily respon-
sible for the supervision and implementation of the collective agreements ne-
gotiated between unions and employers' associations.
After the Second World War the dual structure of interest representation
through unions and works councils was reinstitutionalized with the Collective
Bargaining Act of 1949 and the Works Constitution Act of 1952. But the politi-
cal situation was now completely different. This time the aim of the employers
and of the legislature was not to bring a revolutionary council movement under
union control, but to counteract a politically united union movement (Einheits-
gewerkschaft) that advocated nationalization of basic industries and full co-
determination in line with their anticapitalist Munich Program of 1949. What
was on the agenda now was a neutralization of the works councils and their
separation from the unions. When the conservative majority under Adenauer
passed the Works Constitution Act in the Bundestag, it was against fierce oppo-
sition from the labor movement. The Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB)—
the national union confederation—spoke of a "black day in the development
of democracy" in Germany. The unions objected especially to the denial of full
parity of representation on the supervisory board (unlike in the coal and steel
industries, where parity had been instituted in 1951, for all other industries
only one-third representation was enacted), the tight limits on the councils' co-
determination rights on economic matters, and regulations that kept the unions
out of the workplace and insulated the works councils from their influence.
1
When the Social-Liberal coalition under Chancellor Willy Brandt pushed
ahead with its policy of social reforms, amendment of the Works Constitution
Act in 1972 was a central objective. The employers saw an erosion of manage-
rial prerogatives and spoke of a "trade union state" (Gewerkschaftsstaat) about
to destroy free enterprise and strangle the economy. This was certainly a politi-
cal statement which greatly exaggerated the fears of the employers. Although
1. After the battle was lost for the unions, a leading and influential union intellectual, Victor
Agartz, drastically phrased the view of the Left: if the union movement still wanted to achieve its
goals, it must chase the Bundestag into the Rhine (Pirker 1979, 282).55 Germany: From Collective Voice to Co-management
the works councils' co-determination rights on social and personnel matters
were strengthened, co-determination was not extended to financial and eco-
nomic matters. And although the access of the unions to the workplace and
their links with the works councils were improved, the formal independence
of the councils and their exclusive jurisdiction over interest representation at
the plant level were not affected.
In the course of time, the industrial relations actors have learned to live with
works councils; in fact, they have used and adjusted them in line with their
goals. Unions had to accept and cooperate with a workplace institution that
was not an integral part of their organization and had its own constituency.
Employers had to accept that broad areas of managerial decision making had
become an arena of joint regulation. The facts of industrial life forced manage-
ment to change its style and become willing to cooperate with the works coun-
cils, whereas the councils had to learn the rules of co-management by tran-
scending their collective-voice function and taking responsibility for
productivity and economic success.
There are three main challenges to the status quo. The first is that works
councils are now the pivotal institution of the German industrial relations sys-
tem, their position vis-a-vis the union having been continually strengthened.
What consequences will this have for the future role of unions within the dual
system of interest representation? Second, the world of business is undergoing
profound changes in market environment and production spheres. New net-
works of cooperation and producer-supplier relations, as well as joint ventures
and transnational conglomerates, blur the demarcation lines of the traditional
business unit which the law defined as the realm of the works council. What
strains are put on the works council by the dual development of globalization
on the one hand and decentralization on the other? Third, what will be the
consequences for the works council if the new models of management-initiated
direct participation at the workplace spread over the economy?
3.2 Institutional Base and Legal Rights
German works councils are representative, encompassing, and mandatory in
the private sector (manufacturing and services). A different system of staff
representation exists in the public sector, which provides for staff councils with
somewhat fewer powers than works councils.
Works council members are elected by the whole workforce of establish-
ments with five or more permanent employees. Companies with more than
one establishment have central works councils, composed of delegates of the
establishment-level works councils. A works council for a group of companies
(Konzernbetriebsrat) is to be formed if requested by the works councils of
subsidiaries employing at least 75 percent of the group's workforce. Wage




























































strength. Employers and senior executives (leitende Angestellte)
2 are not repre-
sented by works councils. It is estimated that no more than 2 percent of all
employees are leitende Angestellte in the sense of the law.
There are no official figures about the actual number of works councils. The
DGB collects data on all establishments with an affiliated union present, and
the Ministry of Labor regards the DGB figures as giving a fairly correct picture
of the real distribution. According to the DGB, some 180,000 members of
works councils were elected in more than 33,000 establishments in the 1990
elections (table 3.1). There are no exact figures on the number of establish-
ments that are legally eligible to have a works council; hence, the percentage
of eligible establishments and workers that are covered by the works council
system can only be estimated, and it is believed that about 35 percent of estab-
lishments that could have a works council have one. Establishments without a
works council are almost exclusively small firms with fewer than 100 or, more
typically, fewer than 50 employees. The percentage of total employment cov-
ered by the works council system is therefore much higher than the percentage
of establishments. It is estimated that about 70 percent of the eligible work-
force is covered by works councils.
Data are also collected by the Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft
2. Leitende Angestellte (senior executives, senior managers, or leading personnel, as the term is
sometimes translated; the official translation of the Works Constitution Act speaks simply of "ex-
ecutive staff") are persons "who under their contract of employment and by their status in the
company or establishment (1) are entitled on their own responsibility to engage and dismiss em-
ployees on behalf of the establishment or one of its departments; or (2) are endowed with general
authority (power of procuration) or full power of representation or power to sign (Prokura), the
latter also being important in relation to the employer; or (3) regularly carry out other duties which
are important for the existence and development of the company or an establishment and fulfill-
ment of which requires particular experience and knowledge, if, in doing so, they either essentially
make decisions on their responsibility or substantially influence these decisions; this may also be
the case with stipulated procedures, particularly those based on legal provisions, plans or guide-












































































Sources: A, DGB; B, IW.
(DAG)—a small union of white-collar workers—and by a research institute
maintained by employers, the Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft (IW). Both
institutions, however, cover significantly fewer establishments than the DGB.
The DAG survey extends only to some 7,000 establishments where the DAG
has members and elected representatives. The IW survey is more reliable as it
is based on quota sampling by size of establishment. The IW also gradually
expanded its sample, from 4,528 establishments in 1981 to 14,644 in 1990.
Since the DGB does not include establishments in which DGB unions are not
present, it is biased in regard to council members' union affiliation and votes
gained by DGB unions. Table 3.2 therefore presents the figures from both
samples.
In eligible establishments that do not have a works council, three employees
or a union represented in the establishment
3 can take the initiative to call a
meeting, with the aim to set up an electoral board. Alternatively, a labor court
can set up such a board on application from three employees or the union; in
this case, an external union official can be delegated to the electoral board.
Electoral board members enjoy the same legal protection against dismissal as
works council members.
Works councillors have a term of office of four years. Prior to 1989 it was
three years, and prior to 1972 two years. The extension of the time in office
reflects the increasing professionalization of a works councillor's role. The
number of council members varies with the number of employees; establish-
ments with 100 employees have five members, those with 500 employees nine,
and those with 1,000 employees 15 (table 3.3).
The larger the firm, the higher the number of full-time works councillors.
Establishments with 300 to 600 employees must give full-time release to one
of their nine works council members; establishments with more than 1,000
3. To be legally "represented" in an establishment a union need have no more than one member.58 Walther Muller-Jentsch

















































Source: Works Constitution Act, sections 9 and 38.
aTwo further members for every additional 3,000 employees.
bOne further member to be released for every additional 2,000 employees.
employees must release three members; and establishments with more than
5,000 employees must release at least seven members (table 3.3). Other, more
favorable arrangements can be made by collective agreement between unions
and employers' associations, or by a works agreement between works council
and employer. Volkswagen, for example, has a works agreement that provides
for the full-time release of all works council members.
The numerous and effective participation rights of German works councils
are tied to a general obligation to cooperate with management in "a spirit of
mutual trust" for "the good of the employees and of the establishment" (Works
Constitution Act, section 2(1)). The council is required to negotiate "with a
serious desire to reach agreement" (section 74(1)); "acts of industrial warfare"
as well as "activities that interfere with operations or imperil the peace of the
establishment" are inadmissible (section 74(2)). Works councils are also
obliged to observe confidentiality of information. Matters defined by the em-
ployer as "trade or business secrets" may not be shared with the workforce. In
fact, these rigid regulations can be and have been circumvented informally
without resulting in legal action.
The works council's participation rights include:
1. Co-determination rights on social matters, including principles of remu-
neration, introduction of new payment methods, fixing of job and bonus rates
and performance-related pay, allocation of working hours, regulation of over-
time and reduced working hours, leave arrangements and vacation plans, and59 Germany: From Collective Voice to Co-management
the introduction and use of technical devices designed to monitor worker per-
formance (section 87);
2. Co-determination rights on personnel matters, especially questionnaires
and testing methods and guidelines for recruitment, transfer, up- and down-
grading, and dismissals (sections 94 and 95);
3. Veto rights on individual staff movements, such as hiring, grading, trans-
fer, and dismissal—this right, however, is limited to specified cases (sections
99 and 102);
4. Information and consultation rights over personnel planning and over
changes in work processes, the working environment, and jobs; a full co-
determination right only exists when these changes "are in obvious contradic-
tion to the established findings of ergonomics" and prove to be "a special bur-
den for the employees" (sections 90 and 91);
5. Information rights on financial matters and alterations: a standing com-
mittee of the works council, the finance committee (Wirtschaftsausschufi) must
be informed by the employer "in full and in good time of the financial affairs
of the establishment"; the same applies in case of planned changes "which may
entail substantial prejudice to staff interests" (sections 106-12).
The information and consultation rights of works councils over the introduc-
tion of new technology were extended by the 1989 Works Constitution Act
amendment. While the DGB wanted full co-determination, the law strength-
ened the consultation and information rights of both works councils and af-
fected employees. Employers now must not only inform but also consult the
works council in good time, so that its suggestions and objections can be taken
into account (section 90(2)). The employer must also inform affected employ-
ees about planned measures and their effects on their jobs and formally discuss
with them how their skills may be adapted to the future requirements. Employ-
ees are entitled to call in a member of the works council to the discussion
(section 81(3)).
The works council has strong participation rights in the field of health and
safety. Among them are: (1) information and consultation rights concerning
working procedures and the working environment, as far as necessary for the
prevention of accidents; (2) co-determination rights on "arrangements for
the prevention of employment accidents and occupational diseases, and for the
protection of health on the basis of legislation or safety regulations" (section
87(7)); and (3) rights of supervision with respect to a firms's compliance with
applicable legal safety regulations.
The Work Safety Act (Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz) of 1973 requires certain
firms to hire company physicians (Betriebsdrzte) and professional safety staff
(Fachkrdfte fur Sicherheit). The law gives the works council co-determination
rights on the appointment, dismissal, and task assignment of these personnel.
In general, works council participation rights are strong in social matters,60 Walther Miiller-Jentsch
less strong in personnel matters, and weak in financial and economic matters.
The potential for works council intervention in managerial decision making
decreases with the proximity to essential business decisions. This confirms the
nature of the works council as a body designed to reconcile conflicts of interest
between workforce and management. Councils can act as co-management di-
rectly on social affairs and personnel policy; in other matters they can only
indirectly challenge managerial authority and the existing power relations at
the workplace. For example, the council can hold up decisions on staff move-
ments where it has veto rights, or it can withhold consent on overtime where it
has co-determination rights, in order to obtain concessions on other issues.
Being subject to a general peace obligation, works councils cannot call
strikes, but they may appeal to an internal arbitration board, called a concilia-
tion committee, which is chaired by an outsider, or to the labor court.
There is no doubt that the works council is the most important and most
effective institution of the German co-determination system.
4 Representation
on the supervisory boards of large companies has mainly a supportive and
supplementary function for the works council (Bamberg et al. 1987). Three-
quarters of the elected workforce representatives on supervisory boards in
firms under the jurisdiction of the 1976 Co-determination Act are also works
councillors (Witte 1980). Being represented on the supervisory board enables
the works councils of large companies to get more reliable information about
economic matters and the firm's strategic goals.
The results of negotiations between the works council and management are
laid down in "works agreements." In large enterprises there exist hundreds of
works agreements which are sometimes extensive documents regulating the
details of wage systems, working conditions, and the like. Works councils that
do not negotiate works agreements are usually in a weak position. One of the
rare studies on works agreements shows that 80 percent of firms with 200 or
more employees had written works agreements in the early 1980s (Knuth
1982). More than four-fifths of them regulate issues on which councils have
enforceable co-determination rights. However, among manufacturing firms
4. There are three different forms of representation at the board level in Germany: (1) equal
representation in the coal and steel industry (Montanmitbestimmung) under legislation from 1951,
(2) subparity representation in companies with more than 2,000 employees under the Co-
determination Act of 1976, and (3) one-third representation in companies with 500 to 2,000 em-
ployees under the Works Constitution Act of 1952.
For the unions Montanmitbestimmung is the most important model of co-determination since it
provides for full parity and uncontested union representation on the supervisory board. Also, one
member of the executive board, the "labor director," is appointed solely by the supervisory board
representatives of the employees. But coal and steel is a declining sector with no more than 30
companies and fewer than half a million employees. Subparity representation covers more than
500 companies with a total of about 4.5 million employees. It remains below full parity even
though 50 percent of the supervisory board members are workforce representatives; this is because
the chair, who is appointed by the shareholders, has a casting vote, and at least one employee
representative must be elected from among leitende Angestellte. The third form of representation
is the weakest and covers roughly 1,400 companies with about one million employees.61 Germany: From Collective Voice to Co-management
with more than 2,000 employees, 85 percent had formal bilateral regulations
on matters not covered by legal rights to co-determination (Witte 1980).
In 1989 a special law was passed allowing leitende Angestellte (see n. 2)
to elect separate representative committees (Sprecherausschiisse der leitenden
Angestellten). Neither the unions nor the employers' associations were in favor
of a second legal representative body at the workplace. Regardless of their
concerns about frictions between the two institutions, the Free Democratic
party, junior partner in the coalition government, was able to gain the legisla-
tion as a boon for its client organization, the Union der leitenden Angestellte
(ULA), which had lobbied for separate committees since the 1960s. The ULA
represents some 48,000 middle managers, roughly 10 percent of the total,
mainly in the chemical, metal-manufacturing, and electrical industries.
The first elections to the new Sprecherausschiisse took place in 1990. Elec-
tion may be held in establishments with at least 10 eligible voters if requested
by a majority of these. A survey by the IW covering 568 committees with 2,854
members reports a turnout of 88 percent. More than 80 percent of those elected
did not stand as candidates of a trade union or professional association, and
only 3 percent of the elected members were women (Niedenhoff 1991).
3.3 Works Councils and Unions
As legal institutions works councils are formally independent of unions and
have their own constituency, being elected not by union members only but by
the entire workforce of an establishment. Nevertheless, most works councillors
are loyal union members with close ties to their union. In practice unions and
works councils depend on each other. Unions supply works councils with in-
formation and expertise through educational courses or furnish them direct
advice through union officials. Works councils, in turn, are pillars of "union
security": union members are usually recruited by works councillors who are,
contrary to the legal provisions, often regarded as workplace union representa-
tives.
5 This makes the works councils indispensable for the unions and adds to
their power vis-a-vis union officials and headquarters. That power, in turn, is
checked by the fact that election and reelection to a works council usually
depends on being nominated on a trade union list.
The majority of works council members are elected on lists of unions affili-
ated to the DGB, although in some industries members of DGB unions make
up only a minority of elected works councillors (table 3.2). Establishments
with a majority of DAG or unorganized works councillors are usually found
in the banking and insurance, retail, catering, hotel, and food processing indus-
tries. There are also some big companies in the computer and media industries,
such as Siemens, IBM, Nixdorf, and Bertelsmann, with low union density of
5. IG Metall, the German metalworkers' union, estimates that 97 percent of all new members
are recruited by works councillors.62 Walther Miiller-Jentsch
about 10 to 15 percent—which, however, does not necessarily imply that union
members are in the minority on the works council.
As to the different bargaining domains of unions and works councils, the
activities of the latter generally relieve the unions of the representation of local
and sectional interests. Grievances and local disputes are also usually settled
by the works council in such a way that the union is relieved of the representa-
tion of particular group interests, allowing the union to concentrate on common
interests, for example, higher wages and shorter working hours. Recent devel-
opments have brought about a modification of this general pattern of the divi-
sion of labor between the two institutions as traditional demarcations have be-
come blurred.
During the 1960s and 1970s it was usual for works councils in large compa-
nies to negotiate informally with management about additional wage increases
after conclusion of an industrywide wage agreement, although this practice
was not authorized by the law. Matters settled in collective agreements can
legally be regulated by works agreements only if the collective agreement ex-
pressly authorizes supplementary work agreements by an "opening clause."
As early as the 1970s, important collective agreements on working condi-
tions and new technology made use of opening clauses, by mandating supple-
mentary works agreements to allow for the flexible implementation of general,
industrywide rules. The two most prominent examples were the 1973 collec-
tive agreement on "humanization of work" in the metal industry and the 1978
agreement on new technology in printing. Both laid down general rules on
working conditions that were to be worked out in detail by works councils and
management in supplementary works agreements. This tendency toward local
co-determination complementing and supplementing union bargaining at the
industry level increased with the flexible working hours policy of the 1980s.
More than 10,000 works agreements were negotiated in the metal industry
after the 1984 settlement that followed the strike for the 35-hour workweek.
The downside of this is that works councils increasingly complain about the
burdens imposed on them, demanding an extension of the services provided to
them by the unions and more full-time works councillors. Unions, however,
are short of staff for delivering extensive advice to works councils on their
local activities.
In principle, a stable coalition between works councils and external unions
has developed on the basis of a division of labor in the representation of inter-
ests that has been characterized by Streeck (1979) as a "contradictory unity."
Its stability requires that a sufficient number of loyal trade unionists are elected
as works councillors. For this reason the results of the council elections are of
primary importance for the unions. Challenges may come from two sides: from
competing unions and unorganized groups mobilizing protest votes and from
oppositional groups within the trade union itself that demand a more militant
or, to the contrary, more moderate policy.
As to the first possible challenge, DGB-affiliated unions have been success-63 Germany: From Collective Voice to Co-management
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ful in filling works council seats with their own members (table 3.2): according
to union sources more than three-quarters, and according to the employers
more than two-thirds, of all elected works councillors belong to a DGB union,
showing a much higher rate of unionization among works councillors than
among workers. Only two unions, in the retail, banking, and insurance sector
and in the agricultural sector, have to concede large numbers of council seats
to competing unions and unorganized groups (table 3.4).
Support for internal union opposition is quantitatively marginal. Alternative
union lists are typically presented by active Vertrauensleute or militant union
dissenters in large companies. They usually demand a break with "social part-
nership" and support more democratic nomination and election procedures.
Since the early 1970s, challenges of this kind have emerged in large establish-
ments of the automobile, steel, shipbuilding, and chemical industries. In sev-
eral cases, oppositional trade unionists have scored spectacular successes. In a
few establishments, foreign workers have also challenged the official union
lists following complaints about underrepresentation.
On average in a large establishment, four or five lists of candidates compete
at the works council election: two from the respective DGB-affiliated unions—
one for the blue-collar constituency and the other for the white-collar group
6—
a DAG list for white-collar workers, a list of "independent" nonunion candi-
dates, and sometimes a list from the Christian Union Federation (Christlicher
Gewerkschaftsbund), a numerically unimportant splinter organization.
Officials of unions represented in an establishment have legal rights of ac-
cess to the establishment and may attend works council meetings after giving
6. The Works Constitution Act treats blue-collar and white-collar workers as separate groups,
each of which elects its council members by separate secret ballot. It is also possible, however, to
hold a joint election if this is approved by a majority of each group. This is the usual practice in
two-thirds of the establishments with works councils.64 Walther Muller-Jentsch
notification to the management. They must also be invited to attend council
meetings if requested by one-fourth of the members of the council.
Unions also have their own representational body at the workplace, at least
in the most important industries and establishments. This is called the Ver-
trauensleutekorper, the assembly of elected or appointed union stewards (Ver-
trauensmanner or Vertrauensfrauen). Usually union stewards are elected by
the union members in a department or work group of between 30 and 50 work-
ers. Their functions are limited and mostly include services for the organiza-
tion, such as information and instruction for union members, recruitment, and
the distribution of union material. Stewards are also expected to support the
unionized works councillors. In many cases, Vertrauensleute are both the mes-
sengers of the works council and the mouthpieces of work groups. In cases of
conflict with the employer, they function as informal organizers of industrial
action.
In the past IG Metall and other unions tried to build up the Vertrauensleute
as a counterweight to the Betriebsrdte, causing rivalry and conflict between the
two. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were strands of internal union
opposition with militant Vertrauensleute as their backbone. Especially in IG
Metall and IG Chemie (the chemical workers' union), rank-and-file activists
organized unofficial strikes, opposed established works councils,and became
the representatives of discontented groups among the membership. But the ri-
valry between Vertrauensleute and Betriebsrdte ended with a victory for the
latter. This was due to the firm legal establishment of the works councils and,
not least, their strategic position for the recruitment of union members. Today
it is no longer control but support of council activities that unions expect from
Vertrauensleute. Since most unions have made the unionized works councillors
ex officio members of the Vertrauensleutekorper, in most establishments the
executive committee of the Vertrauensleute is dominated by works councillors.
In recent research covering 33 establishments with more than 300 employees
in the North Bavarian engineering industry, Schmidt and Trinczek (1991) dis-
tinguish three typical patterns of division of labor between unions and works
councils:
Works councillors of type A (fewer than 20 percent) see themselves primar-
ily as union activists and more as representatives of the working class as a
whole than of a particular workforce. Their loyalty to the union is nearly un-
shakable, many of them simultaneously holding office in union committees on
the local, regional, or national level. Whenever the union calls for industrial
action, they lend their support by initiating warning strikes and imposing over-
time bans. Recruiting new union members is a job of great importance for
them, but even stronger emphasis is placed on safeguarding and supporting
the organization and activities of the Vertrauensleute, whose resolutions are
loyally respected.
Works councillors of type B (about one-half of the sample) consider the
interests of the workforce and the firm to be just as important as those of the65 Germany: From Collective Voice to Co-management
union. In principle, while being loyal members of their union, they always look
for possibilities for compromise and mediation between conflicting demands.
Where compromise seems impossible, they side with the workforce. Unlike
type A, they are not strongly committed to the union line on warning strikes
and overtime bans. But they do take seriously the recruitment of new union
members, regarding it as a duty to the union in return for its services. Consider-
ably less priority is given to supporting the Vertrauensleute.
Works councillors of type C (roughly 30 percent) have an instrumental ori-
entation toward the union. They have no ideological barriers against attending
educational courses offered by employers or "independent" institutions. For
them, the interests of the workforce, or even the firm, come first since the firm's
prosperity is seen as the fundamental basis of their policy. Often they complain
about the union's poor knowledge of the particularities of their situation and
about the one-sidedness of the union's political orientation. Low union density
in their establishments is a comfortable argument for them to back their claim
of being representatives of the whole workforce and not of a union. No special
effort is invested in union recruitment, and little support is provided for
Vertrauensleute activities.
3.4 Works Councils and Employers
German works councils are elected by and composed of employees only.
They meet with the employer at least once a month. The employer bears all the
costs of a council's activities. According to a survey by the IW, the average cost
of the works constitution, including council elections, conciliation committees,
and labor courts, amounts to DM 440 per employee per year. The bulk of this
(DM 285) pays for the day-to-day activities of the works councils (Niedenhoff
1987b). In large companies, works councils have not only their own offices but
also secretarial staff, and sometimes even expert staff with university degrees.
All companies with more than 100 permanent employees must set up a fi-
nance committee (Wirtschaftsausschufi). Its members are appointed by the
works council, and it may also include senior executives. Its monthly meetings
are appointed by the works council, and it may also include senior executives.
Its monthly meetings are attended by the employer, who must inform the com-
mittee in full and in good time of the financial affairs of the establishment and
their implications for employment and long-term personnel policies.
A survey of 315 works councils in the printing, publishing, electrical engi-
neering, and ceramics industries shows what councils regard as the most im-
portant matters they must deal with; respondents could choose three out of a
list of nine items (table 3.5). A cluster analysis divides the councils in three
groups with typical clusters of priorities: (1) traditional tasks—34 percent of
the councils mention personnel matters, classification into wage grades, and
health and safety as their main set of activities; (2) rationalization measures—
38 percent of the councils concentrate on technical change and further educa-66 Walther Miiller-Jentsch
Table 3.5 Main Tasks of Works Councils




















tion; and (3) working-time questions—28 percent are mainly concerned with
questions of working hours and overtime.
The three groups do not seem to correlate with structural variables like eco-
nomic sector, size of company, or recent changes in employment level. It seems
rather that each firm's specific conditions determine a council's main tasks.
Plausibly, technical change often evokes activities for further training, and
managerial efforts to attain greater flexibility call for council action on work-
ing time.
Overtime is a very important issue. Works councils usually do not refuse
their consent when management wants employees to work longer; many em-
ployees like the extra pay. Since overtime is subject to co-determination, how-
ever, works councils frequently use it for package deals to get concessions
from management on other matters. If a workforce reduction is in the offing,
councils usually do not agree to overtime unless management reveals its plans
and offers a "socially acceptable" solution. Sometimes councils ban overtime
during wage negotiations if their union calls for it. In some industries, espe-
cially those organized by the metalworkers and the printers, most councils fol-
low their union's line not to extend working time into the weekend; this does
not preclude occasional extra Saturday shifts in manufacturing and regular
Sunday shifts in newspaper editing and printing.
Legally mandated cooperation with the employer does not exclude conflict
and disagreement, but in most cases cooperation and trust between works
council and employer prevail. Employers' acceptance of the works council and
its tasks has generally increased, and the uncertainties and resistance raised by
the amendment of the Works Constitution Act in 1972 has largely disappeared
in subsequent years. This is the general finding of a panel study investigating
the labor relations of some 60 manufacturing firms between the mid-1970s
and the early 1990s. The earlier survey (Kotthoff 1981), carried out shortly
after the 1972 amendment, revealed a rather negative picture of works council
relations with management. Effective interest representation was found in only67 Germany: From Collective Voice to Co-management
one-third of the establishments, while the in the others works council activities
were classified as poor and insufficient. Fifteen years later, the follow-up study
(Kotthoff 1993) showed a picture that had changed remarkably for the better:
now in two-thirds of the establishments Kotthoff found effective interest repre-
sentation. Improvements in labor relations have taken place in most establish-
ments. Even under the stress of economic recession and pressures for industrial
restructuring, the works constitution had become widely accepted as the most
important piece of machinery for conflict resolution. Kotthoff concludes that
management has come to accept what he calls the "spirit of co-determination."
Kotthoff's findings are confirmed by a recent study using qualitative inter-
views with 111 senior managers (Eberwein and Tholen 1990). No fewer than
96 percent of those interviewed had a positive attitude toward the activities of
the works council. Managers valued in particular the council's collective voice
function (table 3.6). Some even expressed the opinion that, "if the works coun-
cil did not exist, it had to be invented."
Quite frequently, managers consciously take advantage of the confidence the
works council commands among the workforce, asking it to share responsibil-
ity not only in difficult personnel matters but also for policies and strategies
aimed at more ambitious goals. The advice given to employers by their re-
search institute, the IW, is to consider the works council as a "factor of produc-
tion" and as serving essential functions as an agent of information and commu-
nication. It saves time and money to cooperate with the works council as a
partner and thereby improve the working atmosphere (Niedenhoff 1990).
If a company goes through economic difficulties, works councils usually
cooperate with necessary adjustment measures. Among the most common
ways of coping with slack demand is employment reduction by jointly ap-
proved early retirement schemes or financial incentives for voluntary redun-
dancies. Tolerated and sometimes even supported by the works council, man-
agement in some mass production industries may also offer foreign workers
from outside the European Community financial compensation for giving up
their jobs—in the 1980s in addition to the incentives provided under the 1983
Table 3.6 How Managers See the Works Council
Response Percentage of Managers
Important for management as a partner for discussion 50
Important for the representation of the interests of
the workforce 29
Important for conveying information between
management and workforce 11
Used as part of the personnel department 6
Useless, even damaging 4
Total 100
Source: Eberwein and Tholen (1990).68 Walther Miiller-Jentsch
legislation to encourage foreign workers to return to their native countries. It
is also true that, at times, works councils agree to temporary employment con-
tracts for new hires if they fear a reduction of the workforce in the near future.
In general, works councils do not oppose management policies for the mod-
ernization and rationalization of production; in fact, they support such policies
if they are convinced that they can improve the firm's potential for economic
survival and success and if they are assured that two essentials are met: no
involuntary dismissals and no wage reductions subsequent to internal rede-
ployment (Kern and Schumann 1984). The way in which work organization
and the production system were rationalized and modernized in German firms
has improved the acceptance and strengthened the position of the works coun-
cil in many companies. Although it is difficult to measure the economic effects
of the works council, it is widely regarded as an important factor in accounting
for the high productivity of German industry, contributing by creating and con-
solidating social consensus.
The 1972 amendment of the Works Constitution Act gave works councils
information and consultation rights on changes in work processes, the work
environment, and job design. A survey of 30 engineering companies showed
that over 90 percent of the works councillors and over three-quarters of the
managers were satisfied with the legislation (Kreikebaum and Herbert 1990).
Although it does not offer strong participation rights, its practical relevance is
highly appreciated by both sides, even though many works councillors would
prefer full-blown co-determination rights in these matters.
There is no single pattern of labor relations across industries as far as ratio-
nalization and restructuring processes are concerned. Kern and Schumann
(1984) found a number of differences between the automobile, machine tools,
and chemical industries. But these are differences only of degree and in the
intensity of information, consultation, and cooperation. In the chemical indus-
try, the works councils regard themselves as partners of management and do
not interfere in its modernization strategy; their activities are centered on social
matters and health and safety questions. In the automobile industry, works
councils are much more involved in the modernization of the production sys-
tem. Their role has become strongly professionalized, and works councillors
are very self-confident; they are also able to extract comprehensive information
from management. The basis of cooperation in this industry is a broad under-
standing that the restructuring of production and the labor process must serve
a double goal: to increase productivity and product quality on the one hand
and to improve working conditions on the other. Finally, in the machine tools
industry, labor-management relations are mostly based on informal arrange-
ments, with management playing a leading role; works councillors are less
professionalized and less informed. Nevertheless, as Hildebrandt and Seltz
(1989) maintain, a pattern of high-trust labor relations prevails in this industry,
at least in the Baden-Wurttemberg region where their research was conducted
and where the industry's most important firms are located.69 Germany: From Collective Voice to Co-management
Unfortunately, there has been no systematic research about the relations be-
tween foreign employers and managers and their works councils. It seems that
American and British managers especially find it difficult to understand the
German co-determination system. If they try to ignore it and enter in guerilla
warfare with the works council, they sooner or later have to "face the facts of
life." Since the respective union pays special attention to such cases, foreign
firms usually cannot avoid the formation of a works council. Ultimately, they
have to come to terms with the reality of an institutionalized workforce repre-
sentation system endowed with legally enforceable participation rights. Some
foreign employers have decided to delegate this matter entirely to their German
personnel directors, leaving them complete freedom in dealing with the
works council.
As in several other countries, new forms of employee involvement and par-
ticipation have been introduced in Germany as part of a more sophisticated
approach to human resource management. Still, German-style "participatory
management" continues to differ from the Anglo-American pattern in that it
does not try to displace or erode institutionalized workforce representation, but
rather is complementary to it. Quality circles and teamwork are the two main
models of management-led employee participation. Quality circles are
problem-solving groups aimed at improving personal work behavior and moti-
vation as well as labor relations at the workplace. Work teams aim at improved
utilization of workers' abilities and experience, and at improved informal so-
cial relations among employees (Malsch 1989; Beisheim, Eckardstein, and
Miiller 1991).
If some unions and works councils first rejected management-led participa-
tion, especially quality circles, today their position has changed. Now, union
and works council representatives often go so far as to regard them as a first
step toward "co-determination at the workplace." Since the mid-1980s several
works agreements on quality circles have been signed specifying the circles'
composition, procedure, and agenda, as well as the role of the works council
in their governance. A first content analysis (Breisig 1991) of a small sample
of works agreements on quality circles covered various big companies in the
automobile and chemical industries. As a rule these companies have large blue-
collar workforces and high union density rates. In other firms, quality circles
and similar arrangements were established unilaterally by management be-
cause works councils were either uninterested or opposed.
The few available figures on quality circles indicate that they have greatly
expanded during the 1980s. A group of researchers (Antoni, Bungard, and
Kiibler 1990) interviewed the personnel departments of the 100 largest compa-
nies (measured by sales) in 1985-86 and 1989-90. In the latter period, they
found that quality circles and similar problem-solving groups had been estab-
lished in 50 percent of the companies, as compared to 40 percent in 1985-86;
another 11 percent were planning to establish them. Quality circles are to be
found in production (38 percent of the firms), marketing (12 percent), R&D70 Walther Miiller-Jentsch
(12 percent), and personnel and training (10 percent). Companies with quality
circles had had them for eight years on average and still thought highly of
them. Opposition to quality circles comes primarily from middle management;
works councils were reported to be the least opposed. The latter finding is
confirmed by Kotthoff's follow-up study, in which he noticed resentment of
quality circles only among weak works councils. Strong works councils were
found to be self-confident enough to accept a role in the institutionalization
and regulation of quality circles.
As to teamwork, companies in the automobile industry in particular are pro-
foundly restructuring production and work organization. Alarmed by the MIT
study (Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990), which showed large productivity gaps
with Japanese and even American automobile producers, nearly all German
companies have started or are planning to introduce teamwork. Most ambitious
of all is Opel, the German subsidiary of General Motors, which originally
planned to involve all its employees in teamwork by the end of 1992. Daimler
Benz (Mercedes) intends to restructure production work more gradually and
to introduce teamwork for roughly 50 percent of the direct workforce by the
mid-1990s. Volkswagen, which has an extended network of quality circles,
called VW-Zirkel, started with semiautonomous working groups in some
smaller establishments and is now on the brink of introducing this type of work
organization at one of the six production lines in their main plant, Wolfsburg.
In most companies, management and works councils have signed works
agreements on teamwork providing for extra time for team discussions, the
possibility for teams to elect a group spokesperson, and better pay for more
integrated and more flexible work tasks.
The question of initial and further vocational training is of paramount im-
portance not only for the economic success of the firm but also for the market
situation and earnings prospects of its employees. German unions have always
paid close attention to initial vocational training and have recently intensified
their activities on further training. Unions played an active part in the modern-
ization of the vocational training system in industries like building and con-
struction and mechanical and electrical engineering (Streeck et al. 1987). Sev-
eral unions have also negotiated collective agreements on further training and
retraining that, according to Mahnkopf (1990, 7), serve as "a substitute for the
lack of [legal] co-determination rights" in this area.
In Germany, apprenticeship training is regulated by the Vocational Training
Act of 1969. Most apprentices, who account for roughly 65 percent of each
age cohort, spend three years in a program that involves three or four days per
week of on-the-job training and one or two days of education in a public voca-
tional school. Training is administered by "chambers of commerce and indus-
try" or "chambers of artisans," with compulsory membership of all employers
and legally mandated participation of "employee delegates"—mostly union-
ized—who have a say in all training-related matters. Works councils also par-
ticipate in the governance of the training system, as the law gives them consul-71 Germany: From Collective Voice to Co-management
tation rights on the establishment and equipment of training facilities and
co-determination rights on the implementation of training programs and the
appointment and removal of full-time training staff. In addition, councils su-
pervise the employer's compliance with all applicable training regulations, in
the same way in which they monitor compliance with other rules and statutes.
Works council participation rights in further training are still more exten-
sive, partly because of the weaker legal regulation in this area. (It has already
been mentioned that the unions try to fill this gap with collective agreements.)
Under the Works Constitution Act, works councils have co-determination
rights on the content and procedure of retraining and further training and on
the selection of trainees; special employment contracts for trainees also need
the consent of the works council. As Streeck et al. (1987, 21-22) point out,
works councils as a rule take their participation rights seriously. Most works
councils of larger firms have set up special training committees (Bildung-
sausschusse). According to a survey of 315 works councils in four industries,
training committees are found rarely in firms with fewer than 300 employees,
but frequently in firms with more than 1,000 employees (table 3.7).
Works council training committees deal mostly with matters of apprentice-
ship training. For them this field is more manageable than the less structured
and "newer" area of further training. Works councils are often not competent
enough and lack the time to get into the subject deeply, and they need and
expect more advice from their union. This, however, does not mean that they
regard further training as a negligible matter or are unaware of its increasing
relevance for survival and success in product and labor markets. In their daily
activities, councils emphasize the general need for expanding opportunities for
further training on and off the job, and they encourage workers to keep their
qualifications up to date. They also negotiate with management on release from
work for training and on the kind of training measures to be provided to spe-
cific groups of employees (Kiihnlein and Kohlhoff 1991, 134). Discussions
between works councils and managers on training-related questions are fre-
quent; in the survey mentioned above, 80 percent of works councils reported
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such talks. Written agreements, however, are less frequent: only 40 percent had
negotiated works agreements on training matters, and the density of formal
regulation was found to be unevenly distributed between industries (table 3.8).
In the 1960s and 1970s most unions negotiated "protection against rational-
ization" agreements. These were basically defensive, providing for financial
compensation if retraining measures for workers threatened by redundancy
were not possible. Since the late 1970s some unions—among them those rep-
resenting metalworkers, printers, construction workers, and chemical work-
ers—have fought, and sometimes even struck, for collective agreements taking
a more forward-looking approach. The most extensive regulations of this kind
are contained in an agreement for the metal industry in Baden-Wiirttemberg
(the famous Lohn- and Gehaltsrahmentarifvertrag I). The agreement commits
the employer to ascertain regularly the establishment's skill needs, given ongo-
ing and future technological and organizational changes, and to consult once a
year with the works council on the matter. The works council for its part is to
assess the training needs from the perspective of the workers and is entitled
to discuss the results and its related proposals with the employer. Subsequent
to this, the employer must put forward a skill development plan (Qualifikati-
onsplan) for the establishment.
Three and a half years after the agreement had been signed, a research team
found that there was still a considerable discrepancy between rules and reality:
two-thirds of the managers and three-quarters of the works councils were not
aware of the existence of a Qualifikationsplan (Bahnmuller, Bispinck, and
Schmidt 1992, 347). Still, the general conclusion suggested by the body of
existing research is that unions and work councils know the increasing neces-
sity of further training for firms and employees and that they want to participate
more actively in this expanding field but need more competence, time, and ex-
perience.
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3.5 Works Councils and Workers
Being representative bodies, works councils are influenced by their constit-
uents mainly through the selection of their members.
7 The high turnout at
council elections (table 3.9) shows that workers are keenly interested in their
results. A comparison with other elections reveals that turnout in council elec-
tions is second only to the general national election (Niedenhoff 1987a). In the
late 1950s and 1960s participation oscillated around 75 percent; in 1975, after
the amendment of the Works Constitution Act, it jumped to over 80 percent;
and in 1990 it fell again by several percentage points (table 3.9). As a rule,
participation among blue-collar workers is slightly higher than among salaried
employees, and the drop in turnout in 1990 was less significant for the former
group.
The Works Constitution Act stipulates that wage earners and salaried em-
ployees must be represented on the works council according to their relative
numerical strength (section 10). Nothing, however, is said about the representa-
tion of women and foreign workers. Both groups are clearly underrepresented,
although their shares in works councils seats have slightly increased recently
(see table 3.1). The traditional social profile of works council members is male
(about 80 percent) and native German, with a standard full-time employment
contract as a skilled worker or as a supervisory and technical staff member. In
fact, for some of its members, the works council serves as a career ladder for
political and professional advancement. Experienced council members may
either move on to political office in a party, a union, or a local council or change
over to a management job. The latter is more likely among white-collar works
councillors. Some recent studies recognize that white-collar employees have
become more accepting of collective interest representation through the works
council—a pattern that has been observed especially in high-tech enterprises
(Kotthoff 1992).
A problematic relationship continues to exist between works councils and
foreign workers. Of a representative sample of the foreign population in Ger-
many (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 1981, 1986), only one-third of the foreign
workers regarded the activities of their works councils as satisfactory. Works
councils were perceived as unfamiliar with the problems of foreign workers,
and as mainly representing the interests of the German workforce or the em-
ployer. In fact, foreign workers generally run a higher risk of redundancy than
German workers. Their rate of unemployment is higher, and dismissals are
twice as frequent as among German workers (Jaeger 1989). Studies about em-
ployment reduction in the automobile (Dohse 1976; Dombois 1982) and the
steel and coal industries (Schafer 1985) found that under the threat of mass
7. Councils are, however, legally required every three months to call a "works meeting" of all
employees, to which the council must report on its activities.74 Walther Miiller-Jentsch


























redundancies the works councils do not actively oppose, and often tacitly ap-
prove, "soft" discriminatory measures aimed at filtering out foreign workers
from outside the European Community, especially if this can help them avoid
redundancies among German workers.
3.6 Outlook
Co-determination, we said at the outset, is a learning process; more pre-
cisely, it is a process during which individual and corporate actors learn to take
into account the strategies and goals of their counterparts and thereby modify
their own strategies and goals. The practices, rules, and institutions that emerge
from their antagonistic, competing, or joint actions differ from their individual
goals; they are the combined result of all the various actors' intentions. In this
sense, the industrial relations system can be understood as an institutional or-
der that is—partly tacitly and partly explicitly—negotiated and adjusted to
changes in the balance of power and in environmental conditions.
In the German case, the dual system of interest representation was shaped
over more than half a century during which its actors, institutions, and levels
of rule making changed in their relevance and function according to the pre-
vailing constellations of economic, political, and social forces. The strains of
contemporary changes in the world economy and in the organization of pro-
duction have not only not destroyed the dual system but have confirmed its
stability and flexibility. Nevertheless, certain remarkable institutional changes
and shifts have occurred.
Today, the position of the works council is much stronger than it was in the
1950s and 1960s. In response to economic and technological change, the major
German unions have developed a coherent workplace strategy (Betriebspolitik)
under which they try to attain qualitative objectives—on matters like work
organization and training—through the works councils. The links between75 Germany: From Collective Voice to Co-management
works councils and unions are today largely ones of mutual support; only a
minority of works councillors regard themselves as union agents. While the
ties between unions and their members are becoming looser, the relationship
between works councils and unions seems to be growing closer. If, as can be
expected, the tendency toward a "disaggregation of industrial relations"
(Crouch 1986) continues, the responsibilities of the works councils will con-
tinue to expand; this, in turn, will increase the demand for union support and
expertise. The unions of the future will, therefore, be less bargaining machines
than support organizations for the works councils.
After a period of skepticism of and opposition to employer-sponsored partic-
ipation and involvement schemes, many works councils now actively cooperate
with the kind of human resource management that usually accompanies com-
prehensive restructuring of production. If the rationale for this is that works
councils will increasingly move into the role of co-manager, two other develop-
ments could reinforce this. One is the gradual change in the composition of
works councils in favor of technical staff and salaried employees. Their profes-
sional interests and attitudes are more easily reconciled with managerial goals.
The other, ironically, is the transformation in East German companies. Since
there is no tradition in East Germany of open conflict, the works councils that
replaced the old workplace union committees (Betriebsgewerkschaftslei-
tungen) have difficulties finding their new role as "conflict partner," particu-
larly since the struggle for economic survival drives them into collaboration
with management to a much higher degree than their colleagues in the West.
As is widely known, the German industrial relations system is highly for-
malized and representative, with industrial unions and works councils accus-
tomed to acting on behalf of the workers (Stellvertreterpolitik). Today these
traditional actors face the emergence of work groups and production teams.
While previously participation, co-determination, and collective bargaining
were exclusively the business of representative institutions, now, with a larger
space for more actors and a greater variety of patterns and coalitions, centrifu-
gal tendencies are likely to become more effective. Sooner or later the struc-
tural characteristics of the German model may be modified, and the dual sys-
tem might give way to a triple system, with sectoral bargaining between trade
unions and employers' associations, enterprise negotiations between work
councils and management, and direct participation by work groups with
elected team leaders. As a result the highly formalized and strongly representa-
tive model may be softened and weakened. And there is no guarantee that the
integration of the formal and representative institutions with the emerging de-
centralized and more informal structures will succeed.
Following major changes in the division of labor in the world economy,
businesses have adopted a global perspective. Multinational mergers and joint
ventures and the restructuring of the logistical chain between producer, sup-
plier, and distributor threaten to undermine the participation rights of works
councils set up for spatially unified business units within a national territory.76 Walther Miiller-Jentsch
How can a works council exercise participation rights in an establishment for
which the relevant decisions are made elsewhere? It is true that efforts are
made to set up multinational European works councils, but so far their partici-
pation rights are much weaker than those of German councils and more like
those of German finance committees (Wirtschaftsausschufi), which have infor-
mation and consultation rights only. As far as the new logistics is concerned,
there are discussions about adjusting the co-determination system to the new
networks between producer, supplier, and distributor. In some cases working
parties of the various works councils have been created to look into the
problems.
Finally, the challenge of German unification is putting the established sys-
tem under considerable stress. The transfer of institutions and the extension of
organizational domains from the West to the East has proceeded with fewer
frictions than expected. But industrial relations practices cannot be transferred
so easily. The handling of industrial disputes, labor law cases, and joint conflict
management demand experience and skill, which were not cultivated under
the authoritarian Communist regime. It is true that the "social partners" played
a major role in the transformation from a command economy to a social market
economy and in the process built something like a new Arbeitsgemeinschaft*
The social and economic problems that demand to be solved may, however,
exceed their capacities. Both sides may thus feel permanently tempted to aban-
don their joint understanding and return to adversarial strategies.
It is also true that the old Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitungen in East German
workplaces have been replaced by works councils. But their activities greatly
differ from those of their counterparts in the West. Works councils in the East
are above all concerned with the economic survival of their firms and collabo-
rate closely with a management that must still learn its proper role. Also, many
foreign investors acquiring companies from the government privatization
agency, the Treuhandanstalt, lack experience with the German co-
determination system. It is still likely that in the long run, the outcome in the
East will gravitate toward the strong pattern of the West. But it is quite possible
that the East will not end up simply as a copy of the West and that the copying
will not leave the original untouched.
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